Abortion

[Shredderbeam]

1) Dogs pretty clearly have consciousness as well. If consciousness is the deciding factor to personhood, does that mean dogs are people as well?

I agree! I don't think dogs are people, but they should be treated with moral consideration.

 

[tMoon]

1) Dogs pretty clearly have consciousness as well. If consciousness is the deciding factor to personhood, does that mean dogs are people as well?

2) It is completely valid but it's also completely valid to do it anyway but you have to accept the consequences for your actions if they do not go the way you intended.

Even if dogs and other animals have a consciousness, there is a lacking sense of self that is found within humans. I do not find it fair to treat dogs and other animals with moral impunity, but they are not people; rather, they're animals that while existing, function no where near the cognitive level of humans.

Yeah, you have to recognize the consequences for your actions, but there are also ways to treat said consequences. In the case of an accidental pregnancy, there is abortion. In the case of accidental injury, there is medical care.

I agree! I don't think dogs are people, but they should be treated with moral consideration.

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[malakadang]

I think the consciousness-personhood-continuum argument here needs to be fleshed out more. You've made a factual conclusion that dogs exhibit characteristics worthy of moral consideration, but lack something that humans have which gives humans 'personhood' or rights. That in and of itself does not tell you what you should and should not do, nor how you ought, or ought not to act. If a fact is worthy of moral consideration, that implies you are considering the fact alongside other facts also worthy of moral consideration. In essence you're weighing things up, and when you put weights on a scale, the standard of measurement is kg or pounds, so likewise here, what is your standard of measurement? A rights-analysis is always incomplete by itself, because at its very best, it can only tell you what not to do, but it will struggle to tell you what to do.

 

[Shredderbeam]

I think the consciousness-personhood-continuum argument here needs to be fleshed out more. You've made a factual conclusion that dogs exhibit characteristics worthy of moral consideration, but lack something that humans have which gives humans 'personhood' or rights. That in and of itself does not tell you what you should and should not do, nor how you ought, or ought not to act. If a fact is worthy of moral consideration, that implies you are considering the fact alongside other facts also worthy of moral consideration. In essence you're weighing things up, and when you put weights on a scale, the standard of measurement is kg or pounds, so likewise here, what is your standard of measurement? A rights-analysis is always incomplete by itself, because at its very best, it can only tell you what not to do, but it will struggle to tell you what to do.

I agree, it definitely needs to be fleshed out more. I believe that what accords moral consideration to a being is their capacity for subjective consciousness, or their ability to experience. My standard of measurement is this: I am a being that has a capacity for subjective consciousness, and I dislike others doing harm to me, so I don't do harm to others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness).

 

[malakadang]

I agree, it definitely needs to be fleshed out more. I believe that what accords moral consideration to a being is their capacity for subjective consciousness, or their ability to experience. My standard of measurement is this: I am a being that has a capacity for subjective consciousness, and I dislike others doing harm to me, so I don't do harm to others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness).

So:

I dislike others doing harm to me.
Harming others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness) increases the probability of others doing harm to me.
Therefore I shouldn't harm others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness).​

So would I be right in saying your moral standard is to minimize harm to yourself? That would presumably also apply to both refraining from action, and also acting? Prima facie this seems incomplete. How do you resolve a situation where neither action nor refraint from action promotes or reduces the probability of you getting harmed?

Also, surely some harm is good for you - harm that others inflict - or harm that you yourself accept. I'm not necessarily talking about physical harm either. A sacrifice one makes could reasonably be categorized as a 'harm' (or not), yet presumably you're trading some harm now for a better future / future with less harm.

 

[Shredderbeam]

So:

I dislike others doing harm to me.
Harming others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness) increases the probability of others doing harm to me.
Therefore I shouldn't harm others (that have a capacity for subjective consciousness).​

So would I be right in saying your moral standard is to minimize harm to yourself? That would presumably also apply to both refraining from action, and also acting? Prima facie this seems incomplete. How do you resolve a situation where neither action nor refraint from action promotes or reduces the probability of you getting harmed?

No, it's not a probability game for me. It's a mixture of emotional empathy and Kant's categorical imperative.

Also, surely some harm is good for you - harm that others inflict - or harm that you yourself accept. I'm not necessarily talking about physical harm either. A sacrifice one makes could reasonably be categorized as a 'harm' (or not), yet presumably you're trading some harm now for a better future / future with less harm.

Depending on what it is, some harm could be beneficial to be in the long run, sure. I don't like harm being done to me against my will, though, so even if I perceive that doing harm to another will benefit them long-term, I don't do it.

 

[malakadang]

No, it's not a probability game for me. It's a mixture of emotional empathy and Kant's categorical imperative.

So put bluntly, you wouldn't do to others that you wouldn't want done to yourself, and that accords with your moral sense /emotional empathy - in the case of harm? [I've probably got it off again; I'm struggling to come up with a precise formulation of how you would approach each moral problem - the formulation you had above seems to be missing/implying a premise].

In any case, my next question would be if I lived life, as best as I could in conformity with your standard, what would be the presumably positive outcome? Why should I follow your standard and not another standard? If you said that likely outcome would be a miserable death, then I'd obviously say ugh, nty. But if you said the likely outcome is that I'll live a very successful, happy, etc. life, then I'll be reeled in. That however says something as to what the application of the standard is supposed to achieve, and also the nature of morality (if it exists, and in what character it exists as). Alternatively your standard would not answer to the consequences of its use, and so the question still applies if that is the case.

Depending on what it is, some harm could be beneficial to be in the long run, sure. I don't like harm being done to me against my will, though, so even if I perceive that doing harm to another will benefit them long-term, I don't do it.

Is that not a probability analysis? Or is the probability analysis the successor to the categorical imperative / emotional empathy one, and the latter two logically antecedent? Also to clarify, you wouldn't do harm to another to benefit them long-term, is that because you wouldn't want someone to do that to you, or because if everyone did that the world would be a shit place, or doing that would be emotionally repugnant, or a combination?


Since you also mention the categorical imperative, what is your view on lieing? To tie it back to abortion, I can certainly see situations where lieing about your views on abortion - it being the equivalent of a stop at the barbers - to have the potential to cause you harm. Damaging reputation, etc - certainly a real possibility. Yet Kant isn't a fan of lieing. What gives in your moral analysis?

 

[SuF]

Even if dogs and other animals have a consciousness, there is a lacking sense of self that is found within humans. I do not find it fair to treat dogs and other animals with moral impunity, but they are not people; rather, they're animals that while existing, function no where near the cognitive level of humans.

Yeah, you have to recognize the consequences for your actions, but there are also ways to treat said consequences. In the case of an accidental pregnancy, there is abortion. In the case of accidental injury, there is medical care.



Support

So for arguments sake I will just accept your premise. Many of the great apes have been shown to have more mental power than babies. They have complex emotions, have engaged in strategic warfare, tactical engagement, mourn their dead, express empathy towards one another, help the elderly, etc. I think under your definition many of the great apes would be considered more human than a baby would be and vastly more so than a fetus. Does that mean we should treat chimps as people?

 

[tMoon]

So for arguments sake I will just accept your premise. Many of the great apes have been shown to have more mental power than babies. They have complex emotions, have engaged in strategic warfare, tactical engagement, mourn their dead, express empathy towards one another, help the elderly, etc. I think under your definition many of the great apes would be considered more human than a baby would be and vastly more so than a fetus. Does that mean we should treat chimps as people?

Sorry some of these responses take so long, I end up thinking I responded and it appears I didn't.

I'm pretty liberal when it comes to animal rights and am not a huge fan of abuses towards more intelligent animals, but no, chimps should not be treated as people since they are not people.

The problem with my argument (as are there counter arguments) is this attempted juxtaposition of fetus's and live children. We can argue when consciousness begins, when a sense of self begins, when they're individualistic, etc. and when arguing on such matters it may be that babies are not close to levels of certain animals; however, a living, breathing child that is fully developed, has a brain, and has the potential to have this concept of self differs from a lump of cells that are currently attempting to develop into the rest of a child.

The cells consist of potential for a child and the child presents the potential for self. I find arguing that this formation of cells coming together and instantly forming a sense of self preposterous on the basis that it skips the step of forming a child. As for the formation of the child, it is heavily documented and is based in science not some subjective form of observation.

If a fetus is not yet capable of anything. I do not believe in the argument against abortion and even if this fetus was capable, I still would bring it down to body autonomy. The individual has the right to their body and even if one argues a fetus has the potential for self, its' entire potential is riding off of the mother and the mother has the right to take it away.

 

[Shredderbeam]

So put bluntly, you wouldn't do to others that you wouldn't want done to yourself, and that accords with your moral sense /emotional empathy - in the case of harm? [I've probably got it off again; I'm struggling to come up with a precise formulation of how you would approach each moral problem - the formulation you had above seems to be missing/implying a premise].

In any case, my next question would be if I lived life, as best as I could in conformity with your standard, what would be the presumably positive outcome? Why should I follow your standard and not another standard? If you said that likely outcome would be a miserable death, then I'd obviously say ugh, nty. But if you said the likely outcome is that I'll live a very successful, happy, etc. life, then I'll be reeled in. That however says something as to what the application of the standard is supposed to achieve, and also the nature of morality (if it exists, and in what character it exists as). Alternatively your standard would not answer to the consequences of its use, and so the question still applies if that is the case.

Hi! I apologize for not responding sooner, I've been out of action with some fairly serious health issues, but I'm all right now!

You've got it right. In the sense of harm, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" pretty much sums up my belief.

I believe that there's no absolute right or wrong (such as from God or something), and that morality is essentially "wired" into our brains through the process of evolution. So, there's no way to objectively prove that my standard of morality is better than another. That said, though, if you lived life according to the Golden Rule (and so did everybody else, which is the tricky part), I believe that your life would be considerably better, as nobody would lie, trick, cheat, steal, etc.

Is that not a probability analysis? Or is the probability analysis the successor to the categorical imperative / emotional empathy one, and the latter two logically antecedent? Also to clarify, you wouldn't do harm to another to benefit them long-term, is that because you wouldn't want someone to do that to you, or because if everyone did that the world would be a shit place, or doing that would be emotionally repugnant, or a combination?

It's not a probability analysis - I just don't like harming somebody regardless if it benefits them in the long run.

It's definitely a combination of the three.

Since you also mention the categorical imperative, what is your view on lieing? To tie it back to abortion, I can certainly see situations where lieing about your views on abortion - it being the equivalent of a stop at the barbers - to have the potential to cause you harm. Damaging reputation, etc - certainly a real possibility. Yet Kant isn't a fan of lieing. What gives in your moral analysis?

Strictly speaking, I believe that you shouldn't lie in general. However, the categorical imperative doesn't establish rules for deciding between more than one rule. For example, say during World War 2 you were hiding Jews in your basement, and the Nazis come knocking, asking if you've seen any Jews. Do you lie, or do you break your promise to protect your friends? So, in certain circumstances, lying can be defensible. I will admit that I'm not a perfect person, and I sometimes lie even when I know I shouldn't.