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The Euthyphro dilemma provides two horns: the first asks: is that which is loved by the gods pious? The second asks: or, is that which is loved by the gods pious?
The purpose of this argument as it can be related to present day secularism is that one can take pious to equal morals (as alluded to by Socrates in the Euthyprho), and, if you are an atheist, you can interchange God(s) with people.
I will not switch them out, however. You may do that if it makes you more comfortable with the material in your answers. What follows is an attempt to answer the Euthyphro dilemma, and thereby hopefully gain a better understanding of the origin of morals.
This is an excellent philosophical exercise that will (hopefully) improve everyone's argumentative skills.
Again, God need not exist for this to be relevant to morality, so replies that include "this doesn't work because God doesn't exist" are useless.
The first horn of the dilemma: That which is pious is loved by the gods. This means that there is some intrinsic value of certain things that is separate from god.
Problems with the first horn:
The first problem is that if there is a separate set of laws determining what is pious and what is not, then all powerful god(s) cannot exist, since there is some set of laws outside of their control that they are subject too - that which makes something pious.
The second problem is that this could be considered impious to suggest that there is something more powerful than God.
The third problem is that God would become merely a law transmitter, not a law giver. He would be like a priest to the priests, telling what the divine law is but doing nothing more. If that is the case, definitions of God need serious reworking.
The Second Horn: The Second Horn of the dilemma states: that which is loved by the gods is pious. This means that the gods determine what is pious and impious based on what the love/like/decide.
Problems with the Second Horn:
The first problem with the Second Horn is that if the god's decide what is pious and what isn't, the concept becomes meaningless. They could decide whatever they wanted to be pious, so, if they so chose, killing could be as long as one of the gods decided it was so. Additionally, they may disagree - so anything could become pious/impious simultaneously. Euthyphro and Socrate alter their definition to say that what is pious is what the Gods agree is pious, but that still leaves problems.
The second problem is that something must be liked for a reason - it cannot be liked because it is liked. Therefore, there must be some reason the gods like certain things. But it cannot be because they are pious, since their liking it makes it pious, so to take this horn of the argument is to say that there is some other quality that determines what the gods like, therefore there is some other quality that determines piety.
The third problem is that God cannot be pious without something loving him. Therefore, there is no source of God's piousness, unless there is an infinite chain of Gods loving Gods. This could be explained in a polytheistic Greek sense, but not in a monotheistic one, unless there were infinite gods loving gods, which turns into a redundancy.
Solution
A potential solution exists in the possibility of a third answer, thereby eliminating the notion that this is a dilemma (two answers.)
A commonly presented idea is that piousness is embodied in God; it is a part of him. He is both the lover and the beloved, the source and the transmitter.
However this still seems to be saying that something is pious because it is loved by God. The argument simply shifts to "is something part of God because it is pious, or is it pious because it is part of god."
Again, if you are uncomfortable talking about ancient greek/modern day piety and religion, replace piety with morality, and God(s) with people. Attempting to answer the argument will be just as confusing.
So, the final question: Do you think there are independent morals separate from some creator of them? Or are they decided upon arbitrarily?
Further reading:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Euthyphro_dilemma
The purpose of this argument as it can be related to present day secularism is that one can take pious to equal morals (as alluded to by Socrates in the Euthyprho), and, if you are an atheist, you can interchange God(s) with people.
I will not switch them out, however. You may do that if it makes you more comfortable with the material in your answers. What follows is an attempt to answer the Euthyphro dilemma, and thereby hopefully gain a better understanding of the origin of morals.
This is an excellent philosophical exercise that will (hopefully) improve everyone's argumentative skills.
Again, God need not exist for this to be relevant to morality, so replies that include "this doesn't work because God doesn't exist" are useless.
The first horn of the dilemma: That which is pious is loved by the gods. This means that there is some intrinsic value of certain things that is separate from god.
Problems with the first horn:
The first problem is that if there is a separate set of laws determining what is pious and what is not, then all powerful god(s) cannot exist, since there is some set of laws outside of their control that they are subject too - that which makes something pious.
The second problem is that this could be considered impious to suggest that there is something more powerful than God.
The third problem is that God would become merely a law transmitter, not a law giver. He would be like a priest to the priests, telling what the divine law is but doing nothing more. If that is the case, definitions of God need serious reworking.
The Second Horn: The Second Horn of the dilemma states: that which is loved by the gods is pious. This means that the gods determine what is pious and impious based on what the love/like/decide.
Problems with the Second Horn:
The first problem with the Second Horn is that if the god's decide what is pious and what isn't, the concept becomes meaningless. They could decide whatever they wanted to be pious, so, if they so chose, killing could be as long as one of the gods decided it was so. Additionally, they may disagree - so anything could become pious/impious simultaneously. Euthyphro and Socrate alter their definition to say that what is pious is what the Gods agree is pious, but that still leaves problems.
The second problem is that something must be liked for a reason - it cannot be liked because it is liked. Therefore, there must be some reason the gods like certain things. But it cannot be because they are pious, since their liking it makes it pious, so to take this horn of the argument is to say that there is some other quality that determines what the gods like, therefore there is some other quality that determines piety.
The third problem is that God cannot be pious without something loving him. Therefore, there is no source of God's piousness, unless there is an infinite chain of Gods loving Gods. This could be explained in a polytheistic Greek sense, but not in a monotheistic one, unless there were infinite gods loving gods, which turns into a redundancy.
Solution
A potential solution exists in the possibility of a third answer, thereby eliminating the notion that this is a dilemma (two answers.)
A commonly presented idea is that piousness is embodied in God; it is a part of him. He is both the lover and the beloved, the source and the transmitter.
However this still seems to be saying that something is pious because it is loved by God. The argument simply shifts to "is something part of God because it is pious, or is it pious because it is part of god."
Again, if you are uncomfortable talking about ancient greek/modern day piety and religion, replace piety with morality, and God(s) with people. Attempting to answer the argument will be just as confusing.
So, the final question: Do you think there are independent morals separate from some creator of them? Or are they decided upon arbitrarily?
Further reading:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Euthyphro_dilemma














