
- Joined
- Apr 21, 2005
- Sythe Gold
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Certainty is axiomatic. You can't disprove certainty without first invoking it. But for those who don't get this, let us try a simple approach.
The common objection presented against certainty is that we can never be certain what will happen tomorrow. This is a valid objection and part of a larger problem in epistemology -- namely the issue of the validity of inductive reasoning. However, it does not follow that just because we presently, logically, cannot be certain of what will happen tomorrow, that we cannot be certain of anything. Indeed we invoke certainty to make such an assertion to begin with.
To make the argument easier to follow, I will use a hypothetical conversation between Alice and Bob.
Anti-certainty advocates will appeal to "confidence of belief", but confidence with respect to what? If they are assigning a probability that a belief will turn out to be the case, then they are assuming a standard of certainty against which to measure their belief. If they replace truth with probability, then they enter infinite regression.
And, naturally, an anti-certainty advocate will claim that "they are certain that there is no certainty" -- a rank contradiction. If you chase them on this issue they will appeal to the "confidence of belief" or probability again, and enter infinite regression (a fallacy of the form: circular reasoning.)
The common objection presented against certainty is that we can never be certain what will happen tomorrow. This is a valid objection and part of a larger problem in epistemology -- namely the issue of the validity of inductive reasoning. However, it does not follow that just because we presently, logically, cannot be certain of what will happen tomorrow, that we cannot be certain of anything. Indeed we invoke certainty to make such an assertion to begin with.
To make the argument easier to follow, I will use a hypothetical conversation between Alice and Bob.
Of course this is proving the affirmative of a rather silly proposition, and there are easier ways to disprove the argument against certainty:Alice: We can't be certain of anything, the best we can do is to maintain beliefs with varying degrees of confidence.
Bob: To address this argument we should first agree that certainty has two forms: conditional certainty, and unconditional certainty. Conditional certainty is of the form "if something, then something else", whereas unconditional certainty is of the form "something is always the case."
Alice: Ok, I agree that the concept of certainty encompasses these two forms.
Bob: So if I make a statement in the form of "if the laws of logic and of physics hold tomorrow as they did today, then the earth will continue to rotate," then you have no objection to this form of certainty?
Alice: I suppose not.
Bob: So if we can always prefix our statements with conditions about the state of things, then we can have a form of certainty in that regard?
Alice: agreed.
Bob: If we can always prefix statements with conditions about the state of things, and thereby derive conditional certainty, then it is unconditionally the case that conditional certainty holds.
Alice: yes.
Bob: If it is unconditionally the case that conditional certainty holds, then we have at least a single instance of unconditional certainty. Therefore certainty exists.
Anti-certainty advocates will appeal to "confidence of belief", but confidence with respect to what? If they are assigning a probability that a belief will turn out to be the case, then they are assuming a standard of certainty against which to measure their belief. If they replace truth with probability, then they enter infinite regression.
And, naturally, an anti-certainty advocate will claim that "they are certain that there is no certainty" -- a rank contradiction. If you chase them on this issue they will appeal to the "confidence of belief" or probability again, and enter infinite regression (a fallacy of the form: circular reasoning.)



