Morality, God, And the Euthyphro Dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma provides two horns: the first asks: is that which is loved by the gods pious? The second asks: or, is that which is loved by the gods pious?

The purpose of this argument as it can be related to present day secularism is that one can take pious to equal morals (as alluded to by Socrates in the Euthyprho), and, if you are an atheist, you can interchange God(s) with people.

I will not switch them out, however. You may do that if it makes you more comfortable with the material in your answers. What follows is an attempt to answer the Euthyphro dilemma, and thereby hopefully gain a better understanding of the origin of morals.

This is an excellent philosophical exercise that will (hopefully) improve everyone's argumentative skills.

Again, God need not exist for this to be relevant to morality, so replies that include "this doesn't work because God doesn't exist" are useless.

The first horn of the dilemma: That which is pious is loved by the gods. This means that there is some intrinsic value of certain things that is separate from god.

Problems with the first horn:
The first problem is that if there is a separate set of laws determining what is pious and what is not, then all powerful god(s) cannot exist, since there is some set of laws outside of their control that they are subject too - that which makes something pious.

The second problem is that this could be considered impious to suggest that there is something more powerful than God.

The third problem is that God would become merely a law transmitter, not a law giver. He would be like a priest to the priests, telling what the divine law is but doing nothing more. If that is the case, definitions of God need serious reworking.

The Second Horn: The Second Horn of the dilemma states: that which is loved by the gods is pious. This means that the gods determine what is pious and impious based on what the love/like/decide.

Problems with the Second Horn:

The first problem with the Second Horn is that if the god's decide what is pious and what isn't, the concept becomes meaningless. They could decide whatever they wanted to be pious, so, if they so chose, killing could be as long as one of the gods decided it was so. Additionally, they may disagree - so anything could become pious/impious simultaneously. Euthyphro and Socrate alter their definition to say that what is pious is what the Gods agree is pious, but that still leaves problems.


The second problem is that something must be liked for a reason - it cannot be liked because it is liked. Therefore, there must be some reason the gods like certain things. But it cannot be because they are pious, since their liking it makes it pious, so to take this horn of the argument is to say that there is some other quality that determines what the gods like, therefore there is some other quality that determines piety.

The third problem is that God cannot be pious without something loving him. Therefore, there is no source of God's piousness, unless there is an infinite chain of Gods loving Gods. This could be explained in a polytheistic Greek sense, but not in a monotheistic one, unless there were infinite gods loving gods, which turns into a redundancy.

Solution

A potential solution exists in the possibility of a third answer, thereby eliminating the notion that this is a dilemma (two answers.)

A commonly presented idea is that piousness is embodied in God; it is a part of him. He is both the lover and the beloved, the source and the transmitter.

However this still seems to be saying that something is pious because it is loved by God. The argument simply shifts to "is something part of God because it is pious, or is it pious because it is part of god."


Again, if you are uncomfortable talking about ancient greek/modern day piety and religion, replace piety with morality, and God(s) with people. Attempting to answer the argument will be just as confusing.

So, the final question: Do you think there are independent morals separate from some creator of them? Or are they decided upon arbitrarily?

Further reading:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma

http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Euthyphro_dilemma

 

I'm having trouble following your argument. Are the two 'horns' supposed to be the same?

 

He accidentally said the same thing twice. He meant 'is that which is loved by the gods pious?', or 'is that which is pious what is loved by the gods?'

 

Morals are a human construct.

 

How do you know?

 

There is no real "proof" that morals are a human construct, just as there is no proof that morals are a religious construct either. There is only theory, back by some evidence mind you - that they are a product of evolutionary biology. So for example humans don't kill each other because it would be harmful to the survival of the tribe, we empathise through the selfish gene etc. etc.

My attempt at an answer to the dilemma would be: I can think of a scenario where perhaps god(s) created a compass of morality/determined certain behaviour as pious based on an analysis of their own existence as an individual and how they would like to coexist with an external party if such a party indeed existed. I use "like" in italics as this would be totally subjective, and I guess "God" as a concept of limitless creative power could create a scenario of existence where, as you suggest, one individual destroying another would be "likeable" activity - but that doesn't fit into the current paradigm and so I guess it could be argued that the establishment of "pious" activity is all part of "god's plan" which is undefined and unknowable.

I am not religious, however, so personally I don't believe morality has anything to do with god.

 

If morality is anything else but a human construct, it loses all meaning. For how can a code of conduct present itself as the proper way to act when its principles are entirely arbitrary? Whether the principles of morality are based on the intellect, on the emotions, or just for practicality's sake, clearly they hold weight in our minds and compel us to action in a way that is unlike anything else. It will follow that they are a human creation.

 

Seemingly - since the problem lies primarily in the God(s), those of which must either be rendered opinionated or the subject of opinion (the same interconnected concept), a third answer is absolutely necessary; the dilemma is inconsistent within the perimeters of it's conditions.

To try to validate the structural integrity of the argument, and any argument, it is essential to first put it's foundation into question;

Why must God be opinionated?

Why are the 'gods' not explicitly considered metaphorical figures? - abstract because the implication of gods with human characteristics(see former question) is both devoid of foundation and, most importantly, a generally unaccepted ideal in both philosophy and any attempt of logic to define and/or investigate the inner-workings of divinity.

The dilemma falls apart in it's argumentative essence once certain lines are blurred, as is essential to the root of any discussion regarding concepts that are 'divine'.

'Gods' is abstract because they're/it's unable to be defined in terms relating to human experience (trying breaks the structural integrity of every aspect of discussion rooted in logic, rendering it 1. pointless & 2. a vocabulary test in a religious academy); redefine God as 'existence', like/relating to.

Doing so makes any rational answer to the dilemma cut & paste, apart from counter-arguments that are strictly faith-based.

The state of existence (to simply exist) implies no morale/thought/opinion. Considering this as well as the constructs that are inevitable to come into existence in the presence of an elevated intelligence (humans), such as ambition to learn, reach better spiritual states of mind, earn money and recognize a defined set of laws, etc etc, (all of which, because of an elevated intelligence, have all but redefined the biological and physiological evolution of the human) morality is begged.

A good example would be the scientific perspective of physical life. Life became(like on Earth) because different aspects of the environment worked in harmony to create a space conducive for life to grow. The same is to be said for morality; morality exists because the evolution of man would be devolution without it.

Morals are neither decided upon arbitrarily, nor independent, separate from their creator (creator = the evolution of the species that follow it, in the presence of that species' elevated intelligence, such as the human).

 

I think you're fundamentally misunderstanding the argument. It's only about deciding the nature of the gods so far as it helps us understand morality. The question is about morality - not about any gods; the point of the Euthyphro is to distinguish between morality as a rational thing or an a-rational thing. Obviously human beings evolved with morality. You claim that morality is not decided upon arbitrarily yet at the same time that it linked to evolution. Something that is linked to evolution is not decided on in the first place: it is merely given. This is the case unless you meant that human beings developed rationality, thus enabling the rise of moral principles. This is a different thing to say and is actually in line with the Euthyphro. The idea is to determine if morality is arbitrary or not

Edit: I may be misunderstanding what you're saying as I find it extremely difficult to decipher your language. If you want to clarify for me I'd appreciate it, but please use plainer language to prevent some vagueness in my understanding.